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ABSTRACT: 
This chapter reflects on the changing nature of humanitarian engagement with epidemics. Case 
studies analysing outbreaks of cholera in North Kivu, Zaire in 1994 and Haiti in 2010 as well as 
an outbreak of polio in the Horn of Africa in 2013 demonstrate the importance of looking 
behind narratives of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ to explore the challenges facing humanitarian 
agencies working in diverse social, political and resource-poor settings.  Many of these 
challenges remain enduring, with the recent outbreak of Ebola in West Africa demonstrating 
that both the scale and nature of humanitarian assistance is currently being shaped by 
narratives linking health and disease with global security. It is also evident that assistance tends 
to be more effective in those places where humanitarian agencies co-ordinate their activities, 
while simultaneously adapting their work to the unique social, political and economic contexts 
in which epidemics occur. 
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Introduction 
 
An ‘epidemic’ is defined as an increase in cases of disease over and above what would normally 
be expected in a community or region during a specified period of time. War, displacement, 
poverty and natural disasters are frequently associated with epidemics; and it is not unusual for 
humanitarian agencies to be called upon to prevent or contain them, especially in resource-poor 
settings. Although there is a considerable body of literature critiquing the work of humanitarian 
agencies on epidemics, it would be misleading to generalize too readily from cases of failure. 
There are many instances in which they have prevented the occurrence of epidemics, but these 
achievements have rarely been recorded in any detail and they are hard to assess 
comparatively. This chapter does not, therefore, attempt to provide a comprehensive overview 
of humanitarian engagement with epidemics. Instead, the first part of the chapter presents 
three case studies from Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Haiti and Somalia. These 
case studies look behind the narratives of ‘failure’ and ‘success’ to explore salient issues which 
routinely arise for humanitarian agencies working in challenging circumstances. The second 
part of the chapter then turns to the largest humanitarian programme ever attempted to control 
an epidemic: the case of Ebola in West Africa between 2013 and 2016. In so doing, it becomes 
evident that humanitarian programmes, which adapt and respond to the specific social, political 
and economic contexts in which they are working tend to be more effective. It is also clear that 
the nature of humanitarian engagement with epidemics is increasingly being shaped by 
narratives linking infectious diseases with global security.  
 
 
A mixed history of humanitarian engagement with epidemics 
 
The inability to prevent the transmission of Vibrio cholerae and Shigella dysenteriae in North Kivu 
region, Zaire (now DRC) in 1994 
 
One much publicized ‘failure’ concerns the reported inability of humanitarian agencies to 
prevent the transmission of Vibrio cholerae and Shigella dysenteriae in North Kivu region, Zaire 
(now DRC) in 1994. By way of background, an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Hutu Rwandans 
fled to the region between July 14th and July 17th 1994. Some of these Rwandans were part of 
the interhamwe (Hutu militia) and had actively participated in the genocide of Tutsi Rwandans, 
but the majority played no such role. In all cases, they sought refuge from possible revenge 
 
 
attacks by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front who had come to power. The poorly 
resourced towns of Goma and Kibumba were overwhelmed by the influx of people, and 
thousands died on the streets of Goma in the last two weeks of July (Goma Epidemiology Group 
1995). Large numbers of refugees were hastily moved to make-shift camps in the region, with 
UNHCR attempting to coordinate the humanitarian assistance provided by various UN agencies, 
NGOs and military forces from Zaire, the U.S., Canada and France (Adelman 1999). 
 
Tragically, almost 50,000 people died from Vibrio cholerae and Shigella dysenteriae during the 
first month of mass displacement. To put it another way, somewhere between 6% and 10% of 
the refugee population died during this time (Goma Epidemiology Group 1995) and it has been 
argued that “the disease effectively followed its natural course, as [if] no action was taken” 
(Guha-Sapir and Salih 1995, 101). Others have taken a similar view, including a senior director 
at Save the Children Fund-UK, John Seaman, who said that “the course of the cholera epidemic in 
Goma appears to have been at best only marginally influenced by massive international action” 
(Seaman 1994, 34). The Goma Epidemiology Group also recorded high rates of acute 
malnutrition among children less than five years old, living in camps. The prevalence ranged 
from 18% to 23% between August 4th and 14th 1994; and these rates were contrasted with an 
estimated prevalence of 5% to 8% in non-refugee populations in Africa at the time. 
 
Explanations for the failure of humanitarian agencies to prevent these public health 
emergencies vary.  It is, of course, hugely challenging to provide adequate shelter, food, water, 
sanitation and health care to hundreds of thousands of people with minimal warning in 
resource poor settings.  With respect to the prevention of Vibrio cholerae and Shigella 
dysenteriae, it is also important to note that both infections were already endemic in the region. 
Given the speed with which people arrived in Goma and surrounding areas, and the fact that the 
majority of them were initially reliant on untreated water from Lake Kivu for drinking, bathing 
and washing clothes, it could even be argued that epidemics were an inevitable outcome. 
Roberts and Toole (1995) take this view. They present data suggesting that as many as half of 
all cases of cholera were acquired in Goma by July 26th (which was before the establishment of 
many camps by humanitarian agencies), and they also point out that there is no data 
demonstrating that the establishment of refugee camps contributed “substantially” to mortality 
from cholera. 
 
These are useful points to raise, but foregrounding the paucity of data does not disprove the 
point that humanitarian agencies may have helped to create the conditions for Vibrio cholerae 
and Shigella dysenteriae to spread. If the accounts provided by the Goma Epidemiology Group 
 
 
(1995), Siddique et al (1995) and Waterman (2004) are accurate, then it seems likely that 
moving large numbers of people into camps whilst simultaneously struggling to provide access 
to clean water, basic sanitation and effective case management did little to prevent 
transmission. Waterman (2004), for example, pointed out that by August 12th, there were still 
up to 1000 people sharing a single latrine in Mugunga camp; while the Goma Epidemiology 
Group stated that by the time humanitarian agencies were in a position to provide each person 
with one litre of purified water a day (which was significantly below accepted humanitarian 
standards of 15-20 litres a day), the epidemic had peaked. Siddique et al (1995) also 
demonstrated that fatalities from Vibrio Cholera and Shigella dysenteriae in treatment centres 
were higher than anticipated due to unexpected resistance to antibiotics such as tetracycline 
and doxycycline; inadequate use of oral rehydration therapy; inappropriate use of intravenous 
fluids; and insufficient experience of health workers in responding to severe cases of these two 
diseases.  
 
The challenges which faced humanitarian agencies in North Kivu region in 1994 foreground a 
number of crucial issues which remain important. First, a comprehensive approach to epidemic 
preparedness and management at times of conflict and mass displacement necessarily requires 
a highly coordinated and well-resourced set of interventions. With around 450 international 
humanitarian organisations arriving in Zaire in a short period of time, it took time to establish 
mechanisms to intervene successfully. Countering critiques of chaos, Stockton usefully points 
out that: “If in Goma some agencies turned up unnecessarily, it is very important to consider 
carefully what might have happened if an insufficient number had turned up…” (Stockton 1998, 
359). It is possible, for example, that Rwandan refugees might have ended up living in 
ramshackled shelters on the outskirts of Goma, without ever acquiring access to clean water or 
sanitation, and thus become indefinitely vulnerable to acquiring and/or transmitting cholera. In 
other words, fatalities from cholera and shigella could have been even worse than those 
recorded in the camps. 
 
The need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach raises two further related points: it is 
always going to be difficult to predict the nature and scale of resources that will be needed 
during a humanitarian emergency; and these difficulties are compounded by the fact that even if 
agencies are technically and logistically prepared, they rarely have any understanding of the 
socio-political and historical context in which they are working. In the case of North Kivu, this 
had catastrophic consequences. Thousands of interhamwe managed to take advantage of the 
chaos on the ground. They reasserted their authority over camp populations and high-jacked 
mechanisms established by humanitarian agencies for distributing food. This undoubtedly 
 
 
contributed to the development of acute malnutrition among children in the camps (Passant 
2009). The importance of adapting interventions to specific social, political and economic 
contexts in which humanitarian agencies are working, remains important today. 
 
The introduction of cholera to Haiti by UN peacekeeping forces in 2010 
 
A second much publicized ‘failure’ concerns the introduction of cholera to Haiti, following an 
earthquake in 2010. This earthquake killed around 220,000 people, injured a further 300,000 
and left 1.5 million people homeless (Disasters Emergency Committee 2015). Nine months later, 
a cholera outbreak began north of Port au Prince, spreading across the country as well as to the 
Dominican Republic and Cuba. There had not been a single recorded case of cholera in Haiti 
before the earthquake (Jenson et al. 2011), and the genetic analysis of the bacterium, Vibrio 
cholerae, subsequently demonstrated that the disease was brought to the country by UN 
Peacekeeping forces from Nepal (Hendriksen et al. 2011). By the end of 2015, 754,373 cases 
and a further 8,964 deaths from cholera had been reported (World Health Organization 2016b). 
 
To understand how this situation came about, it is important to note that Haiti has a long 
history of political instability and economic impoverishment. At the time of the earthquake, 
there was a small wealthy urban elite living in Port au Prince and the majority of the population 
were living on less than $2 a day (World Bank 2009; Rencoret et al. 2010). The country was 
grappling with a complex array of socio-economic issues, including deforestation, land erosion 
and rapid urbanisation. Prior to the earthquake,  an estimated 46% of the Haitian population 
were living in over-crowded, poorly built, ramshackle houses in urban and peri-urban 
environments, often with limited access to clean water, sanitation and health services (Rencoret 
et al. 2010).   
 
The combination of a weak infrastructure, chronically under-funded and partial health services, 
as well as the destruction of a large number of government buildings (including the 
government’s Emergency Operations Centre, courts and police facilities), the collapse of the UN 
headquarters in Port-au-Prince, and the death of almost a third of Haiti’s civil servants, 
prompted a huge international response. In fact, more than $13.5 billion was allocated to Haiti 
by a variety of governments and humanitarian agencies (Knox 2015). The Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) attempted to co-ordinate humanitarian activities. This was no easy task: an 
estimated 2,000 NGOs offered assistance in the first year, 400 of whom provided health care. In 
addition, twenty-six countries provided military support (including the U.S. who sent 22,000 
 
 
soldiers). Reflecting on these events, Kirsch et al have argued that the situation in Haiti was an 
“atypical disaster response driven by the U.S. government and military” (Kirsch et al 2012, 200). 
 
Whatever the driving force, a great deal was achieved in the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake. This included the provision of food, water and health care to hundreds of thousands 
of people. Nevertheless, serious tensions emerged between those receiving international 
assistance and those attempting to meet their needs. Some of these tensions reflect the fact that 
a considerable number of humanitarian workers had little or no understanding of the political, 
social and economic contexts in which they were working. Avoidable issues – such as flying in 
staff who did not speak French or Creole – hampered the relief effort. Resettlement programmes 
were delayed or never completed, in part because the relevant humanitarian agencies did not 
engage effectively with the complex legal issues surrounding the ownership of land; and there 
was widespread criticism at local, district and national levels of high NGO overhead costs that 
reduced the amount of money for direct relief (Elliott and Sullivan 2015). 
 
The introduction of cholera by UN peacekeeping forces from Nepal exacerbated the growing 
tension and mistrust between Haitians and humanitarian workers, fueling rumours and 
conspiracies about the ‘hidden’ motivations underpinning the work of humanitarian agencies. 
The situation was not helped by the fact that it took nearly six years for the UN to acknowledge 
that the infection had been brought to the country by their own peacekeeping forces (Katz, 
2016). These issues remain on going. For example, Haitians attacked UN convoys delivering ‘aid’ 
following a hurricane in 2016 (Brice 2016); and Twitter was used by members of the public to 
specifically ask for donations to be made to Haitian NGOs rather than humanitarian agencies, 
such as the American Red Cross (Agerholm 2016). 
 
It is also important to note that while the initial cholera epidemic was brought under control, 
there is every indication that it will not be eliminated in the near future. Cholera is a disease of 
poverty and local conditions favour transmission. In the first four months of 2016, for example, 
there were almost 14,000 reported cases of cholera; and these numbers exceeded those 
reported in 2014 and 2015 (PAHO 2016). In other words, cholera has become endemic in Haiti 
as a direct, albeit unintended, consequence of humanitarian assistance with the earthquake. 
These troubling events do not negate the fact that hundreds of thousands of people received 
shelter, food and health care in the wake of the earthquake. They do, however, point to a very 
mixed picture of humanitarian engagement in Haiti.  
 
 
 
Humanitarian interventions controlling epidemics among dispersed populations: polio in the Horn 
of Africa, 2013-2014 
 
In contrast to the preceding case studies, this case study analyses why humanitarian agencies 
were able to ‘successfully’ contain the spread of polio in the Horn of Africa. This was particularly 
impressive, given that Somalia has suffered from protracted war and conflict for several 
decades, with famine, epidemics and mass displacement occurring on a regular basis.  Indeed, at 
the time of the outbreak, they faced major difficulties operating in many parts of the country 
due to on-going insecurity, a weak infrastructure and numerous communication and 
coordination challenges. Nevertheless, although the 2013-2014 outbreak of polio in Somalia 
spread to Kenya and Ethiopia, it was possible to interrupt transmission relatively quickly. This 
was not only because an effective vaccine was available, but also because detailed plans had 
already been drawn up to improve immunization coverage levels prior to the outbreak. 
Crucially, these plans involved ensuring that the immunization programme responded to the 
locally specific social and political issues shaping coverage levels. 
 
According to Kamadjeu et al (2014), the outbreak began in Mogadishu, and spread to 46 
districts in South and Central Somalia, over a period of eight months. There were a total of 195 
cases in Somalia, and a further 14 cases in Kenya and 9 cases in Ethiopia.  In contrast to the 
situations described in Goma in 1994 and Haiti in 2010, a coordinated body called the Global 
Polio Eradication Initiative (involving WHO, UNICEF, CDC, FAO as well as iNGOs (such as the 
Catholic Relief Services and the American Red Cross)) worked closely with local government 
officials from the Somalian Ministry of Health and Ministry of Livestock to interrupt 
transmission (UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office 2014).   
 
Containment in urban and sub-urban Mogadishu was rapid and effective.  The outbreak was 
declared by the Ministry of Health within hours of the first case being confirmed; and radio 
commercials and NGO-led social mobilization efforts were up and running 72 hours later to 
inform populations of forthcoming immunization campaigns. These campaigns started five days 
after the first confirmed case (UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office 2014). 
Nevertheless, the outbreak presented considerable challenges in the rural areas of Puntland, 
northeastern Somalia and the Somali region of Ethiopia. These places are inhabited by 
pastoralists, many of whom are mobile, difficult to reach, and distrustful of government and/or 
international agencies. It was, however, possible to design and implement interventions in the 
light of long term, detailed social research among pastoralists as well as experiences acquired 
by international agencies.  
 
 
 
Strategies for increasing the coverage of polio vaccination programmes included tracking 
nomadic groups and working closely with clan leaders. Pre-existing and predominantly trusting 
relationships had already been established by the FAO’s animal health projects (Haydarov et al. 
2016); and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative built on these networks by holding polio 
immunization days in places where people were already known to congregate with their 
livestock, notably watering points and markets.  To encourage attendance, animal vaccination 
days were held at the same time (Kamadjeu et al. 2015). Participation was particularly effective 
because it was informed by “a thorough understanding of [pastoralist classification systems] 
and power structures; the spatial and temporal dimensions of their movement patterns; their 
beliefs and values; how to establish trust through respectful dialogue; and the services that they 
found most relevant” (Haydarov et al 2016, 14). In short, it was possible to halt the transmission 
of polio by adapting the intervention to the local social and political contexts in which infection 
was occurring.  
 
The changing nature of humanitarian engagement with epidemics: Ebola in West Africa, 
2013-2016 
 
The outbreak of Ebola in 2013-2016 presented unique challenges to humanitarian iNGOs, 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, and the governments of the affected countries. The first 
reported case occurred in December 2013 in Meliandou, a small village near Gueckedou, in 
eastern Guinea (World Health Organization 2015b).  The virus subsequently spread to ten 
countries, with Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea facing the largest burden of cases.  By 2016, 
there were 28,616 reported cases and 11,310 deaths (World Health Organization 2016c). These 
numbers are high, and far exceed the total number of cases and fatalities recorded in previous 
outbreaks in DRC, Uganda and South Sudan. This case study asks: why did Ebola spread so 
quickly in these three African countries? Why did the outbreak mobilise such a substantial 
response from humanitarian actors? What were the social and economic ramifications of such a 
large multi-agency international response? Is the involvement of military actors part of a 
broader change linking health and disease with global security?  
 
Explanations for the rapid spread of Ebola are numerous and include the following: first, all 
three countries were recovering from protracted war and conflict, with economic 
impoverishment affecting the majority of the population. In 2014, for example, the UN Human 
Development Index ranked Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea 174, 177 and 178 respectively, out 
of 187 (United Nations Development Programme 2013). Related to this, the health systems in all 
 
 
three countries were characterized by limited resources, expertise and funding. As a result, 
surveillance systems were initially far too weak to detect unknown viral haemorrhagic fevers 
such as Ebola (McPake et al. 2015).  
 
Second, the initial index case of Ebola occurred in eastern Guinea, close to the border of Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, but a considerable distance from the capital cities of Conakry, Monrovia and 
Freetown. With a long history of people moving easily and regularly across borders for both 
social and economic reasons, day to day mobility facilitated the transmission of Ebola in the 
region. It also enabled the spread of the disease to densely-populated urban and peri-urban 
areas (Flahaux and De Haas 2016; ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD 2006). A third and related issue is that 
the respective health systems in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia were organized in different 
ways; and there was no collaborative history of addressing public health problems spanning 
borders. It thus took time to establish effective systems for sharing information between the 
different Ministries of Health in the three affected countries.  
 
Fourth, at the beginning of the outbreak, fatalities from Ebola were high, with estimates ranging 
from 50-70% mortality in confirmed cases (Whitty 2017; Fitzpatrick et al. 2015). 
Understandably, this generated fear, panic and anxiety, especially as there was no vaccine at the 
time, and the biomedical treatment available for people infected with Ebola was limited. 
Insufficient staffing and limited medical supplies did little to appease the situation. Although 
biomedical understandings of the aetiology, treatment and prevention of Ebola changed during 
the outbreak, with guidelines, directives and messages regularly being updated to accommodate 
new knowledge, these changes created confusion across the region. For example, Ebola 
Treatment Centres (ETC’s) were built with a view to isolating and caring for suspected and 
confirmed Ebola patients. However, many people were reluctant to seek a diagnosis and/or 
present themselves for treatment. In part, this reflected the fact that many of the early messages 
to members of the public from Ministries of Health stated that Ebola could be fatal in 90% of 
cases, and they did not emphasize that survival rates were higher with treatment. That said, the 
situation was far from stagnant. As expertise about how to treat people increased and as sick 
individuals were identified earlier in their disease course, survival rates improved. This, in turn, 
encouraged people to come to ETCs, but it took time to establish effective processes and secure 
trust (albeit partial) from the wider population.  
 
Fifth, the imposition of byelaws to control and/or prohibit population movement, as well as the 
widespread use of quarantine measures, was very strict in some places. These measures did 
little to quell anger, fear and suspicion, with resistance to the response being openly expressed 
 
 
to both governments and humanitarian agencies, particularly in the early stages of the outbreak.  
One much cited example of resistance to quarantine byelaws was the attempt to cordon off the 
entire West Point neighbourhood of Monrovia. Tragically, this led to violence between the 
residents and security forces and the death of a 15-year old boy (Onishi 2014).  Furthermore, 
those quarantined were often not provided with food or water in a timely manner, nor was 
there any mechanism to ensure that their livelihoods would be protected. These kind of issues 
help to shed light on why some people hid themselves away when they or their families got sick, 
while others (sometimes successfully) escaped their enforced confinement. 
 
Sixth, humanitarian agencies were unprepared for the epidemic and they were quickly 
stretched to their limits in terms of both expertise and capacity. In contrast to previous 
outbreaks, which involved a smaller number of agencies with expertise in Ebola, the West 
African outbreak involved a large number of agencies, the majority of whom had had no 
previous experience of Ebola. Initially, they had little, if any, idea about how to engage with 
people at a local level with regards to this disease, and this often led to disorganised and 
conflicting approaches and advice. The large number of foreign agencies and actors also meant 
that the governments of the affected countries struggled to coordinate their activities and lead 
the response, a point made by (McPake et al. 2015) when comparing Sierra Leone’s Ebola 
response with that of northern Uganda. This also links to concerns about global health 
governance and the fact that key institutions, including the World Health Organisation, were far 
too slow to respond to the outbreak (Moon et al. 2015). Although some iNGOs, such as Medecins 
Sans Frontiers, reacted quickly to contain the outbreak, other organisations were completely 
unprepared to work in a setting with active Ebola transmission and responded by withdrawing 
personnel and closing down their operations.   
 
Whatever the explanations for the transmission of Ebola within and between Guinea, Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, it is also the case that the epidemic mobilized considerable resources and 
personnel. According to the World Health Organization (2015a), 58 international medical teams 
deployed around 2,500 personnel to work in more than 60 ETC’s. These teams came from 
Europe, the U.S., Cuba, China, Australia and several countries in the African Union (DRC, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda). They worked alongside thousands of colleagues employed by 
Ministries of Health and NGOs in the three affected countries. The scale of the response is 
further exemplified by the fact that an estimated $3.75 billion was spent containing the virus 
between December 2013 and August 2015 (DuBois and Wake 2015). Indeed, it is noteworthy 
that this figure is higher than the combined annual government budget of $2.37 billion for the 
three countries prior to the epidemic (CIA 2013). 
 
 
 
The unprecedented scale of the response created a variety of challenges for governments and 
humanitarian agencies. In particular, the rapid influx of large sums of ‘Ebola money’ distorted 
local economies and disrupted social relationships. In Sierra Leone, for example, young men, 
including motorcycle drivers, were recruited by iNGOs onto burial teams. They were paid 
considerable sums of money for collecting and disposing of dead bodies; and their newfound 
wealth enabled them to set aside or challenge the views of their elders (Lipton 2017). Tensions 
were also evident among frontline health workers.  ETC staff employed by iNGO’s received 
substantial salaries and weekly risk allowances of up to 500,000 Sierra Leonean Leones (SLL), 
which were paid swiftly and reliably. By contrast, staff who were employed by the Ministry of 
Health and Sanitation with similar qualifications in tertiary and secondary hospitals, received 
smaller salaries but similar risk allowances, but these salaries and allowances were frequently 
paid late, erratically or not at all. A further source of tension was that contact tracers and 
community surveillance officers were paid considerably less (100,000 SLL), even though they 
were having to identify Ebola cases at a community level, often without access to protective 
equipment; while staff employed at Primary Health Units did not receive any kind of risk 
allowance (Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation 2015). 
 
The sudden and unexpected availability of ‘Ebola money’ filtering through governments and 
humanitarian agencies not only disrupted social relationships, fueling rumours and accusations 
of witchcraft (Shepler 2017), but it also distorted local economies. As the U.S. Department of 
State  (2013) pointed out, shortly before the outbreak, an estimated 72% of the population were 
living on less than $1 a day (or 4,200 SLL).  With large numbers of Sierra Leoneans engaged in 
the response, many of whom had no formal employment prior to the outbreak, ‘Ebola money’ 
contributed to a sudden rise in the price of primary products (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation 2014) while simultaneously reducing the purchasing power of government 
employees (such as teachers and university staff) whose salaries often went unpaid due to the 
closure of schools, colleges and universities during the outbreak. Other occupational groups 
were also affected, including those employed by mining companies, due to the closure of many 
mines.  Similar issues were reported in Liberia and Guinea, with all three countries reporting 
considerable disruption in the production of iron ore (World Bank 2016). Additionally, 
restrictions on the movement of people and goods, including border closures, reduced internal 
and regional trade for a wide range of other products.  The impact on agricultural production is 
less clear but it is likely that the Ebola outbreak disrupted planting in many places, leading to 
reduced yields of rice and maize, and fueling further increases in the price of primary products 
(World Bank 2015).  
 
 
 
These issues aside, there is no doubt that a unique challenge facing humanitarian agencies 
during the Ebola outbreak concerned the militarized nature of the response. This took slightly 
different forms in each country. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Minister of Defence was 
appointed the director of the National Ebola Response Centre and the Sierra Leonean Armed 
Forces played a pivotal role coordinating the response.  In Liberia, the Minister of Health and 
Social Welfare directed the national response, but the military were still influential, albeit in a 
more supportive way (Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015). In all cases, the governments deployed their 
armies to help impose road blocks, assist with ‘lockdowns’, identify new cases, control access to 
hospitals and ETCs and – in the case of Liberia – ensure bodies were cremated, rather than 
buried (ACAPS 2015; Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015). In addition, 5,000 military personnel were 
deployed by China, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the U.S. These foreign militaries built 
more than 3,000 ETC beds (Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015). 
 
While some scholars and humanitarian agencies welcomed the contribution of both national 
and international armed forces, albeit in a limited way (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2015; Dizard 
2014), others have been more sceptical (De Waal 2014; Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015). The primary 
justification revolved around the point that there was no choice other than to impose states of 
emergency and to use the military. All three countries had weak health systems, lacked the civil 
resources and personnel to respond effectively, and required broad-based strategies involving 
restrictions on movement, the imposition of quarantine (to varying levels) and the ‘safe’ 
disposal of bodies. Given that international armed forces were largely willing to restrict their 
role to the construction of Ebola Treatment Centres, the transportation of goods, and supporting 
the coordination of the response; and given that local populations appeared to have more trust 
in their national armies than the police – at least in Sierra Leone – then one might reasonably 
ask: why not draw on these resources in an emergency?  The counter-arguments include the 
fact that the international armed forces were expensive and inefficient. On occasion, they took 
months, rather than weeks, to build ETC’s compared to some of the iNGO’s doing similar work 
(Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015). A further issue is that all three national armies fostered an 
atmosphere of intimidation and fear which hindered efforts to interrupt transmission. Indeed, 
at a time when it was vital for local populations to comply with wide-ranging public health 
measures, there were numerous indications (particularly in Guinea and Liberia) that the 
militarization of the response may well have exacerbated fears, diminished trust in biomedicine 
and, ultimately, had counter-productive impacts. 
 
 
 
Irrespective of the advantages and/or disadvantages of militarizing the response, the fact that 
national and international armed forces were so engaged reflects a broader shift in the 
increasing militarization of global health more generally. This has been made possible by the 
emergence of a strong narrative linking disease outbreaks to the failure of states, as well as to 
regional and global security. It is epitomized in UN Security Council Resolution 2177 which 
stated that: “the outbreak is undermining the stability of the most affected countries … and 
unless contained, may lead to further instances of civil unrest, social tensions and a 
deterioration of the political and security climate.” The Resolution also states that: “ the 
unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security” (United Nations Security Council 2014). Undoubtedly, the reference to 
‘international peace and security’ is a way of referring to fears and anxieties of resource-rich 
nations. After all, in 2013, the year immediately prior to the Ebola outbreak, an estimated 
21,000 people died from malaria and a further 8,000 children under the age of five are reported 
to have died from diarrhoeal diseases in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone (World Health 
Organization 2016a). Such high fatalities have not elicited anything like the same response. It is 
also striking that a few months before the outbreak of Ebola, polio was declared a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern by the WHO, but received far less international attention 
(McInnes 2016). In short, humanitarian engagement with disease outbreaks is now profoundly 
shaped by a narrative linking health and disease with global security.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented a series of contrasting case studies to reflect on the ways in which 
humanitarian agencies have engaged with epidemics. While not purporting to present a 
comprehensive overview, the cases foreground some of the complex issues that routinely arise. 
These include the challenges of preventing the spread of infectious diseases in countries with a 
long history of war, conflict and mass displacement. In such places, the infrastructure is usually 
weak; sanitation facilities and supplies of clean water limited or non-existent; Ministries of 
Health are under-resourced; and international staff with an understanding of the social, political 
and economic contexts in which they are working are often scarce.  The arrival of hundreds of 
international organisations, all with slightly different but overlapping expertise, adds to the 
challenges of providing an appropriately resourced and coordinated set of interventions. 
 
Other issues are unique to the particular setting and outbreak: the failure to prevent the 
transmission of Vibrio cholerae and Shigella dysenteriae in North Kivu, Zaire (now DRC) in 1994, 
 
 
for example, raised different social, political and logistical issues to those occurring in Haiti 
following the earthquake and the introduction of cholera by UN peacekeeping forces from Nepal 
in 2010. These issues were different again from those occurring during the outbreak of polio 
among dispersed and nomadic populations in Somalia, or the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa. 
Here, the absence of a vaccine, high levels of nosocomial infection, partially effective treatment, 
high fatality rates and the spread of the disease to urban areas within West Africa as well as to 
Europe and the U.S. triggered a large and unprecedented response, involving international 
humanitarian agencies, bilateral agencies, national and international armed forces. In contrast 
to previous military engagements during outbreaks of disease, some of the armed forces were 
involved in more than the provision of logistical support and controlling the movement of 
people. In Sierra Leone, for example, they were closely involved in the design and 
implementation of policy with civilian partners. This reflects the increasing tendency for 
humanitarian engagement to be ever more linked with the securitization agenda. Above all, the 
chapter demonstrates that in those instances where interventions pay close attention to both 
the co-ordination of activities by diverse agencies while simultaneously adapting to the unique 
and differing social and political contexts in which epidemics occur, assistance tends to be more 
effective. 
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